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COP26: What will China do?
As President Biden edges towards passing two gigantic legislative packages to underpin upgraded climate targets for America, Boris Johnson prepares to detail the UK's Net Zero strategy, and the EU wrangles over the details of a multi-billion-euro 'Green Deal', it was always inevitable attention would re-focus on what the world's biggest polluter will contribute to the global climate effort. The sheer scale of China’s emissions mean decisions taken in Beijing matter more than any other country's.
Half of global emissions growth since 1990 came from China. Today the country produces about a quarter of the world's climate footprint. It is one of the only remaining countries still building significant numbers of new coal-fired power stations at home and abroad, more than the entire rest of the world combined. Climate scientists have labelled its existing plans "highly insufficient" to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.
A new UN report published on Friday showed that in the decade ahead global emissions are expected to rise by 16%, not fall by 45% as scientists said are required. The World Resources Institute calculate China is responsible for a quarter of this difference between what is projected and what is needed. Lord Adair Turner - who advises governments on climate change - put it bluntly:
“I think we need to face a simple mathematical fact that if China does not peak emissions until 2030, I do not think we have anything like a 50/50 chance of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Centigrade (Celsius), nor a 90% chance of keeping global warming below two degrees Centigrade.”
Frustration is mounting. This week, the UN Secretary General and Boris Johnson have called together a gathering of leaders on the fringes of the UN General Assembly, described by The Guardian as "last ditch China talks."
Biden's climate envoy John Kerry told the New York Times it could be that China's coal dependence effectively crashes the chances of success at the Glasgow Summit because without action, it "would actually undo the ability of the rest of the world to achieve a limit of 1.5 degrees."
He has been seeking to dip into the Obama diplomatic playbook of engagement with China on climate that he originally helped to craft when he successfully brokered the G2 climate pact between the two biggest polluters before the Paris Summit in 2015. In a landmark speech in Kew Gardens in July, Kerry said:
"Obviously, it is not a mystery that China and the U.S. have many differences. But on climate, cooperation – it is the only way to break free from the world’s current mutual suicide pact... America needs China to succeed in slashing emissions, and China needs America to do its part and do the same. The best opportunity that we have to secure a reasonable climate future is for China and the United States to work together."
By trying to "compartmentalise" climate diplomacy from other areas of US-China disagreement, he has reportedly had 18 meetings with his Chinese counterparts, just since April. The latest talks were in the last fortnight, and were promptly followed up by a visit by Boris Johnson's climate chief Alok Sharma. (The EU appears to be largely absent altogether from discussions with China.)
Yet as of now, less than 50 days out from the Glasgow Summit, no substantive new climate commitments have been forthcoming from Beijing. Reports suggest that the talks have stalled.
Greenpeace China's Li Shuo puts the blame on the new East-West dynamic, saying, "The [US-China] relationship is taking its toll on the planet.” US progressive groups make the same claim. Certainly, it appears so far the old Obama playbook for cooperation on climate isn't working given the wider change of circumstances.
"Give us what we want or we will burn the world down." That's how the long-time observer of Chinese politics, Isabel Hilton, now characterises the position of Beijing.
Lauri Myllivrta argued in Foreign Policy that the change in political conditions since the Obama-Xi deal before the Paris Summit means "being seen as compromising with the United States would be toxic for Xi."
"Back then, the two presidents could provide cover for each other domestically by announcing their commitments together. But today, the domestic dynamics in China are completely different, due to increased assertiveness, nationalism, and fears that the United States is trying to stifle China’s rise."
Ironically, it's not a wildly dissimilar story in the US where public and political opinion has become much more hawkish towards China. Biden would presumably not relish a situation in which Beijing appeared relaxed and confident making pronouncements on the world stage. The political fallout from the hollowing out of the West's manufacturing base, events in Hong Kong, the suffering of the Uigurs, and China's response to the outbreak of Covid19, all means the same may be true within Europe where opinion is hardening too.
The US was never going to allow climate change to silence its criticism on other issues, but Biden may have seen Kerry's advances to China as part of a 'no regrets' approach on climate in the sense of nothing ventured, nothing gained. After all, his words are not being backed up with any serious carrot or stick, and for now the Chinese government continues to hold the line that "China-US cooperation in specific areas is closely linked with bilateral relations as a whole.”
So if neither US or China wants to make any concessions to the other: are we all toast?
Western governments have begun flirting with using tariffs and other trade barriers to erect a new "carbon curtain" between high-carbon economies like China and the lower-carbon West, something Kerry has previously called a "last resort." Putting aside the risk of a trade war, it is not obvious that this would necessarily lead to better climate outcomes if it has the effect of pushing other high-carbon emerging economies like Brazil and Indonesia into closer economic relations with China where they can sell their wares without the same environmental constraints, or conversely if it means the US and Europe cut dubious deals with the likes of Bolsonaro to prevent that from happening.
But Europe and America could find other ways to leverage trade and economic strategy in pursuit of climate progress. They could, for example, choose to remove remaining barriers to trade for goods and services that incentivise greener practises from emerging economies - something recently promoted by the Centre for Policy Studies, the favourite think tank of new Foreign Secretary Liz Truss.
They could also revisit their levels of international climate finance. Fresh data from the OECD shows currently the West is not putting forward substantial investment for developing countries that might limit the influence of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and support cleaner growth in poorer countries along the lines some in the US Congress have proposed. Despite Biden & Johnson's G7 headlines about a Western rival to BRI called "Build Back Better World," this graph puts America's global climate spending pledge into perspective.
It also exposes the US to legitimate criticism that their failures are as great as China's in explaining the lack of international progress. And this is one reason Xi Jingping may choose to go ahead and announce a substantial move by China on climate before COP26, just not on US terms, but instead because it's in China's interest.
There are compelling reasons to believe he may yet flesh out how he plans for China to fulfil the promise he made to peak China's emissions in the decade ahead. Possibly this could come as early as the UN meeting in New York later this week or perhaps more likely at the environment summit China is hosting in Kunming next month.
China's premier appears to be determined to position China's environmental moves as an act of leadership amongst developing countries and a way to create a better image for China. This is manifested in the way his government proactively sought to host that UN summit on biodiversity and pre-empted Western pressure for a Net Zero target with an announcement before Biden even took office, something they have since sought to show they are determined to deliver. Just over the weekend, new constraints on coal based industries and incentives for renewables were enacted.
Since China was scarred by the widespread perception it was responsible for the historic failure to agree a global climate accord at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, most analysts think the Chinese government will want to avoid blame for a bad outcome in Glasgow through theatrical shows of climate leadership. Xi has put what he terms "ecological civilisation" at the centre of his personal brand and reputation to signal a form of environmentalism "with Chinese characteristics," paving the way for new green policies on his own terms.
Putting aside the international politics, there is a powerful economic impetus for China to seek to maintain their domination of clean technology markets. US Senator Lindsey Graham argued ten years ago that "every day that we delay trying to find a price for carbon is a day that China uses to dominate the green economy." (Yes, really… that Lindsey Graham.) It turns out he, like Obama, was correct. America's clean energy industry is now only a third of the size of China's, and forthcoming research from the Onward think tank will show China is beating the G7 economies on patents for new environmental technologies. Onward's research found that China manufactures 73% of electric vehicle batteries, 80% of solar panels, and more than half of newly installed wind power capacity is also Chinese.
There is also a defensive rationale for China to act, of course. Like every other country, China faces severe climate impacts including the possibility 100m of its population could be displaced by sea level rise. Toxic air in its cities has already prompted coal closures near some of its major metropolitan centres. Earlier this year, unprecedented high levels of rainfall caused hundreds of people to lose their lives in floods in Henan province.
So what might China announce at, or more likely before, the Glasgow Summit?
Their Belt & Road investments in coal have been quietly drying up with a Chinese bank quietly walking away from a major coal project in Zimbabwe so this could turn into a broader political commitment from Beijing to end overseas coal financing - something the G7 economies agreed to do themselves back in June. In a context where the US is isolated as one of the only rich economies failing to offer substantial climate finance for developing countries, China could also choose to fill the gap - thus putting Biden in an even more awkward spot with many poorer nations. As a major driver of deforestation in the Amazon and elsewhere, China could also choose to adopt tougher supply chain import rules to force a more sustainable forestry approach from other nations - something Europe and the UK have sought to do in different ways in the past.
But it is China’s emissions at home which matter most. China could choose to peak its emissions by an earlier date than 2030 and then reduce them, not plateau them - something an influential body chaired by the Chinese Vice-Premier recently proposed. “[Peaking in] 2025 seems possible, all the modelling by Chinese teams points to that, and it’s not too late," according to my boss Laurence Tubiana, the French diplomat who crafted the Paris Agreement. Recent analysis by Energy Foundation China suggests this may be a status quo scenario anyway given that 13 Chinese provinces (representing 40% of national emissions) have already peaked, 10 provinces (40% of national emissions) are close to peak, and 7 provinces (20% of national emissions) will continue to grow their emissions in the near term but with a projected national peaking time before 2025. In any case, China has little choice but to peak coal use sooner, and start a rapid phase out, if they are to even hit existing climate targets, according to Dr Shuwei Zhang, from the Draworld Environment Research Centre in Beijing.
Given China's dominance in the electric car market, Beijing might also choose to adopt a hard deadline for phasing out petrol and diesel sales with a policy along the lines the UK is pursuing but that other G7 nations hesitated from endorsing under pressure from diesel manufacturers in June. Today, consumers in China can buy a brand-new EV for as little as €3,700 ($4,400) and already the country anticipates 70% of vehicle sales there will be electric by 2030, up from at least 20% by 2025. European manufacturers are reportedly panicking that they are about to completely lose their home market to China.
Ultimately, it remains a mystery how all these dynamics may ultimately determine what China does next, but how to influence this requires debate. Although Greta has been demonised in Chinese media as a "puppet of Western politicians'' for a mere tweet about the country's climate footprint, it's surprising how little spotlight or discussion there is of what China could or should do. If Biden soon delivers on his climate laws, and puts forward new climate finance, perhaps that may all change. It surely needs to.
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